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ABSTRACT
Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical
aacks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is es-
sential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end,
we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture
the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases.
Specically, the goal of the infrastructure network designer is to
keep the network connected before and aer the aack, while the
adversary aims to disconnect the network by compromising a set of
links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players
aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this
paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to
characterize the optimal strategies of the network defender and at-
tacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters.
Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication net-
works for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical
results.
1 INTRODUCTION
Infrastructure networks are increasingly connected due to the in-
tegration of the information and communications technologies
(ICTs). For example, the introduction of smart meters has enabled
the communications between the users and the utility companies.
Communications with roadside units in vehicular networks can
provide safety warnings and trac information.
However, infrastructure networks are vulnerable to not only
physical aacks (e.g., terrorism, the or vandalisms) but also cyber
aacks. ese aacks can damage the connectivity of the infras-
tructure system and thus results in the performance degradation
and operational dysfunction. For instance, an adversary can aack
the road sensor units and create trac congestion [1]. As a result,
the transportation system can break down due to the loss of roads.
An adversary can also launch denial-of-service aacks to discon-
nect communication networks [2], resulting in inaccessibility of
relevant database for air travel or nancial transactions.
e cyber-physical nature of the infrastructure can also enable
the coordinated aacks on the infrastructure systems that allow an
adversary to use both cyber and physical approaches to disconnect
networks. erefore, infrastructure protection plays a signicant
role to maintain the connectivity of the infrastructure networks.
One way to protect the network is to create redundant links in the
network so that networks can be still connected despite arbitrary
removal of links. is approach has been used in trac networks
by creating multiple modes of transportation, in communication
networks by adding extra wired or wireless links, and in supply
chain networks by making orders from multiple suppliers.
Adding link redundancy is an eective approach when there is no
knowledge of the target of the aacker, and thus the objective of the
network designer is to secure the network by making the network
robust to arbitrary removal of a xed number of links. However, it
becomes expensive and sometimes prohibitive when the cost for
creating links is costly, and the aacker is powerful. erefore, a
paradigm shi to emphasize the recovery and response to aacks
is critical, and the infrastructure resilience becomes essential for
developing post-aack mechanisms to mitigate the impacts. With a
limited budget of resources, it is essential to develop an optimal post-
aack healing mechanism as well as a pre-aack secure mechanism
holistically and understand the fundamental tradeos between
security and resilience in the infrastructures.
To this end, we establish a two-player dynamic three-stage net-
work game formation problem in which the infrastructure network
designer aims to keep the network connected before and aer the
aack, while the objective of the adversary is to keep the network
disconnected aer the aack. Note that each player has a cost on
creating or removing links. Specically, at the rst stage of the
game, the infrastructure network designer rst creates a network
with necessary redundancies by anticipating the impact of adver-
sarial behavior. en, an adversary aacks at the second stage by
removing a minimum number of links of the network. At the last
stage of the game, the network designer can recover the network
aer the aack by adding extra links to the aacked network.
e resilience of the network is characterized by the capability
of the network to maintain connectivity aer the aack and the
time it takes to heal the network. e security of the infrastructure
is characterized by the capability of the network to withstand the
aack before healing. Adding a large number of redundancies to
the network can prevent the aack from disconnecting the network,
but this approach can be costly. Hence, it is important to make
strategic decisions and planning to yield a protection and recovery
mechanism for the infrastructure with a minimum cost.
We adopt subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) as the solution
concept of the dynamic game. We observe that with sucient
capabilities of recovery, the infrastructure can mitigate the threats
by reducing the incentives of the aackers. We analyze SPE of the
game by investigating two dierent parameter regimes. Further, we
develop an optimal post-aack network healing strategy to recover
the infrastructure network. When an aacker is powerful (aack
cost is low), we observe that the defender needs to allocate more
resources in securing the network to reduce the incentives of the
aacker. In addition, agile resilience and fast response to aacks
are critical in mitigating the cyber threats in the infrastructures.
Related Works: Security is a critical concern for infrastructure
networks [3, 4]. e method in our work is relevant to the recent
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advances in adversarial networks [5, 6] and network formation
games [7, 8]. In particular, we jointly design the optimal protection
and recovery strategies for infrastructure networks.
Organization of the Paper: e rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 formulates the problem. Dynamic game analysis
are presented in Section 3. Section 4 derives the SPE of the dynamic
game. Case studies are given in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 DYNAMIC GAME FORMULATION
In this section, we consider an infrastructure system represented
by a set N of n nodes. e infrastructure designer can design a
network with redundant links before the aack for protection and
adding new links aer the aack for recovery. e sequence of
the actions taken by the designer and the aacker is described as
follows:
• A Designer (D) aims to create a network between these
nodes and protect it against a malicious aack;
• Aer some time of operation, an Adversary (A) puts an
aack on the network by removing a subset of its links;
• Once the D realizes that an aack has been conducted, it
has the opportunity to heal its network by constructing
new links (or reconstructing some destroyed ones).
In addition, the timing of the actions also play a signicant role in
determining the optimal strategies of both players. We normalize
the horizon of the event from the start of the preparation of infras-
tructure protection to a time point of interest as the time internal
[0, 1]. is normalization is motivated by the observation made in
[9] where the consequences of een major storms occurring be-
tween 2004 and 2012 are ploed over a normalized duration of the
event. We let τ and τR represent, respectively, the fraction of time
spent before the aack (system is fully operational) and between
the aack and the healing phase. is is illustrated in Figure 1.
0 τ τ + τR 1
Aack Recovery
Figure 1: Attack and Defense Time Fractions.
e goal of the designer or the defender is to create protection
and recovery mechanisms to keep its network operational, i.e.,
connected in this case. Let E1 be the set of links created by the
defender initially (i.e. at time 0). EA ⊆ E1 is the set of links removed
(aacked) by the adversary and E2 is the set of links created by the
defender aer the aack (at fraction τ + τR of the time horizon).
Regardless of the time stamp, creating (resp. removing) links has
a unitary cost cD (resp. cA). e adversary aims to disconnect the
network. us, for any set E, we dene 1E which equals 1 if the
graph (N , E) is connected and 0 otherwise. Values τ , τR , cA and cD
are common knowledge to both the Designer and the Adversary.
As a tie-breaker rule, assume that if the output is the same for the
Adversary, the Adversary chooses to aack the network with the
strongest number of link removals. Similarly, the Designer chooses
not to create links if its utility is the same.
erefore, the utility for the designer (resp. adversary) is equal to
the fraction of time the network is connected (resp. disconnected)
minus the costs of creating (resp. removing) the links. Hence the
payo functions of the designer and the adversary are represented
byUD andUA, respectively, as follows:
UD (E1, E2, EA) =(1 − τ − τR )1E1\EA∪E2 + τ1E1
+τR1E1\EA − cD (|E1 | + |E2 |),
UA(E1, E2, EA) =(1 − τ − τR )(1 − 1E1\EA∪E2 ) − cA |EA |
+τ (1 − 1E1 ) + τR (1 − 1E1\EA ),
where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
As the players are strategic, we study the SPE and analyze the
strategies of the players to the sets (E1, EA, E2). us, we seek
triplets (E1, EA, E2) such that E2 is a best response to (E1, EA)
and that given E1, (EA, E2) is also a SPE. In other words, the SPE
involves the analysis of the following three sequentially nested
problems starting from the last stage of the designer’s recovery
problem to the rst stage of the designer’s protection problem:
(i) Given the strategies E1 and EA, player D chooses
E∗2 (E1, EA) ∈ arg maxE2 UD (E1, EA, E2);
(ii) Given E1, the adversary chooses
E∗A(E1) ∈ arg maxEA UA(E1, EA, E∗2 (E1, EA));
(iii) Player D chooses
E∗1 ∈ arg maxE1 UD (E1, E∗A(E1), E∗2 (E1, EA)).
e equilibrium solution (E1, EA, E2) that solves the above three
problems consistently is an SPE of the two-player dynamic game.
3 GAME ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the possible congurations of the infras-
tructure network at SPE.
We rst note that cA should be not too large, since otherwise A
cannot be a threat to D. Similarly, cD should be suciently small
so that the D can create a connected network:
Lemma 3.1. If cA > 1 − τ , then A has no incentive to aack any
link. If cD > 1n−1 , then D has no incentive to create a connected
network.
Proof. Suppose that cA > 1 − τ . Let E1 be given and B :=
τ (1 − 1E1 ). If A decides not to remove any link, then its payo is
B +τR (1−1E1 )+ (1−τ −τR )(1−1E1∪E2 ) ≥ B. Otherwise, |EA | ≥ 1
andUA(E1, E2, EA) ≤ B+ (1−τ −τR )(1−1E1\EA∪E2 )−cA +τR (1−
1E1\EA ) ≤ B+1−τ −cA < B. us, it is a best response forA to play
EA = ∅. Similarly, if cD > 1n−1 , then if D plays E1 = E2 = ∅, its
utility is 0. Otherwise, its utility is bounded above by 1 − (n − 1)cD
which corresponds to a connected tree network with the minimum
number of links. 
In the following, we thus suppose that cA < 1− τ and cD < 1n−1 .
Note that the SPE can correspond only to a set of situations:
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that (E1, EA, E2) is an SPE. en, we are
necessarily in one of the situations given in Table 1.
Proof. Altogether, 8 situations should be possible. However,
if 1E1 = 0, then it is impossible that 1E1\EA = 1. erefore, the
Situation 1E1 1E1\EA 1E1\EA∪E2
1 1 1 1
2 1 0 1
3 1 0 0
4 0 0 1
5 0 0 0
Table 1: e dierent potential combinations of values of
1E1 , 1E1\EA and 1E1\EA∪E2 at the SPE.
situations where (1E1 ,1E1\EA ,1E1\EA∪E2 ) equaling to (0, 1, 0) and(0, 1, 1) are impossible.
Further, if 1E1\EA = 1, then it is impossible that 1E1\EA∪E2 = 0.
us, the situation (1E1 ,1E1\EA ,1E1\EA∪E2 ) = (1, 1, 0) is impossi-
ble. All other combinations are summarized in Table 1. 
e shape of the SPE depends on the values of the parameters of
the game. In particular, it depends on whether the D has incentive
to fully reconstruct (heal) the system aer an aack of the A. More
precisely, if 1 − τ − τR > (n − 1)cD , then the D prefers to heal the
network even if all links have been compromised by the aacker.
Otherwise, there should be a minimum number of links remained
aer the aack for the D to heal the network at the SPE. We analyze
these two cases in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
4 SPE ANALYSIS OF THE GAME
Depending on the parameters, we derive SPE of the game in two
regimes: 1 − τ − τR > (n − 1)cD and the otherwise.
4.1 Regime 1: 1 − τ − τR > (n − 1)cD
In the case where 1 − τ − τR > (n − 1)cD , the network always
recovers to be connected aer the aack. e potential SPE can
occur in only three of the Situations in Table 1. More precisely:
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that 1 − τ − τR > (n − 1)cD and let
kRA :=
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
. en, the SPE of the game is unique and satises:
• If τR < cA, thenUD = 1 − (n − 1)cD andUA = 0 (Situation
1).
• Otherwise,
– if τ > cD and τR > cD
⌈
n(kRA−1)
2
⌉
or if τ < cD and
τ + τR > cD
⌈
n(kRA−1)
2 + 1
⌉
, then the SPE satises UD = 1 − cD
⌈
n(kRA+1)
2
⌉
UA = 0
(Situation 1).
– If τ > cD and τR < cD
⌈
n(kRA−1)
2
⌉
, then the SPE satises{
UD = 1 − τR − ncD
UA = τR − cA (Situation 2).
– If τ < cD and τ + τR < cD
⌈
n(kRA−1)
2 + 1
⌉
, then the SPE
satises{
UD = 1 − τ − τR − (n − 1)cD
UA = τ + τR
(Situation 4).
Proposition 4.1 is a direct consequence of the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2. Suppose that 1 − τ − τR ≥ (n − 1)cD . e potential
SPEs have the properties given in Table 2.
Situation |E1 | |EA | |E2 | UD UA
1&kRA > 0
⌈
n(kRA+1)
2
⌉
0 0 1 − cD
⌈
n(kRA+1)
2
⌉
0
1&kRA = 0 n − 1 0 0 1 − (n − 1)cD 0
2 n − 1 1 1 1 − τR − ncD τR − cA
4 0 0 n − 1 1 − τ − τR − (n − 1)cD τ + τR
Table 2: Properties of the dierent potential SPEs when 1 −
τ − τR > (n − 1)cD (Note: kRA =
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
).
Proof. First note that any connected network contains at least
n − 1 links. Conversely, any set of nodes can be made connected
by using exactly n − 1 links (any spanning tree is a solution). We
consider a situation where 1E1\EA = 0. en, either D decides not
to heal the network and receives a utility of U ∗ = τ1E1 − cD |E1 |,
or it decides to heal it (by using at most n − 1 links) and receives
a utility of at least U = (1 − τ − τR ) + τ1E1 − cD (|E1 | + n − 1).
e dierence is U −U ∗ = (1 − τ − τR ) − cD (n − 1) > 0. us, D
always prefers to heal the network aer the aack of A. erefore,
Situations 3 and 5 contain no SPE.
Next we consider Situation 4. Since 1E1\EA∪E2 = 1, thenD needs
to create in total at least n − 1 links: |E1 | + |E2 | ≥ n − 1. erefore,
an optimal strategy is E1 = ∅ and |E2 | = n − 1. Since E1 = ∅, the
optimal strategy of A is EA = ∅.
In Situation 2, (N , E1) is connected, and thus |E1 | ≥ n − 1.
Further, 1E1 = 1 and 1E1\EA = 0, and thus |EA | ≥ 1. Since 1 − τ −
τR > (n − 1)cD , then A should remove the minimum number of
links to disconnect the network, and we obtain the result.
Finally, in Situation 1, since 1E1\EA = 1, then D does not need to
create any link during the healing phase: E2 = ∅. Since 1−τ −τR >
(n − 1)cD , then A aacks at most kRA links if and only if it obtains
a nonnegative reward, that is kRA is the largest integer such that
τR −cAkRA ≥ 0 which yields kRA =
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
. us, D designs a network
that is resistant to an aack compromising up to kRA links. Such
solution network is the (|N |,kRA + 1)-Harary network [10]. 
4.2 Regime 2: 1 − τ − τR < (n − 1)cD
We now consider the case where D has incentive, at phase τ + τR ,
to heal the network if at most k links are required to reconnect it,
where k =
⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
< n − 1.
We study the potential SPE in Situations 3, 4 and 5 in Lemma 4.3,
Situation 2 in Lemma 4.4, and Situation 1 in Lemma 4.5.
Lemma 4.3. If 1−τ −τR < (n−1)cD , we have the following results:
• Any SPE in Situation 3 satises E2 = ∅, |EA | = k + 1 and
|E1 | = n − 1, leading to utilities UD = τ − (n − 1)cD and
UA = 1 − τ − (k + 1)cA (occurs only if b 1−τcA c > k);• ere exists no SPE in Situation 4;
• e only potential SPE in Situation 5 is the null strategy:
E1 = E2 = EA = ∅, leading to utilities UD = 0 andUA = 1.
Proof. Suppose that an SPE occurs in Situation 5. Since the
network is always disconnected, thenUD = −cD (|E1 | + |E2 |). e
maximum utility is obtained when E1 = E2 = ∅. us, EA = ∅.
In Situation 4, since any connected network contains at least
n − 1 links, then the maximum utility of D is UD (E1, E2, EA) =
(1−τ −τR )−cD (n−1) < 0. us, D is beer o with a null strategy
(occurring in Situation 5).
In Situation 3, since 1E1 = 1 then |E1 | ≥ n − 1. D can achieves
utility value τ −(n−1)cD by playing a tree network. Since 1E1\EA ,
1E1 then |EA | ≥ 1 andUA ≤ 1 − τ − cA. e bound is achieved by
aacking any one link created by D. We further can show that A
needs to aack k+1 links such thatD will not heal the network. 
In the following, we focus on the SPEs in Situations 1 and 2. In
both cases, 1E1 = 1. us, D creates initially a connected network.
For each node i ∈ N , letdi be its degree. e potential best response
strategies of A to E1 are summarized as follows:
(i) Either A does not aack and obtains a utility ofU (i)A = 0;
(ii) Or A aacks suciently many links so that the network
admits 2 components, i.e., A aacks exactly min1≤i≤n di
links to disconnect a node of minimal degree. en, D
heals the network by constructing 1 link, and A receives
utility
U
(ii)
A = τR − ( min1≤i≤n di )cA . (1)
(iii) Or A aacks suciently many links so that the network
admits ` + 2 components, for some suciently large `
(whose exact value is discussed in the following two lem-
mas). en, D does not heal the network, and A receives
utility
U
(iii)
A = 1 − τ − |EA |cA . (2)
Note that any intermediate value of components in the
range J2; ` + 2K cannot happen at SPE since it amounts to
a lower utility for A.
For convenience, We thus denote
kRA =
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
and kHA =
⌊
1 − τ
cA
⌋
.
Note that kRA (resp. k
H
A ) corresponds to the maximal number of
aacks that A is willing to deploy to disconnect the network at
phase τR (resp. 1 − τ ) so thatU (ii)A (resp. U
(iii)
A ) achieves a positive
value. With this in mind, we can show the following results:
Lemma 4.4. e only SPEs in Situation 2 are such that |E1 | = n−1,
|EA | = 1, |E2 | = 1, UD = 1 − τR − ncD , and UA = τR − cA.
Furthermore, it occurs only if cA ≤ τR and
⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
>
⌊
1−τ−τR
cA
⌋
.
Proof. At an SPE in Situation 2, the utility of D is of the form
1 − τR − cD (|E1 | + |E2 |). It is a best strategy if:
• It is the best strategy of D to heal the network at time
τ + τR , i.e., 1 − τR − (|E1 | + |E2 |)cD ≥ τ − |E1 |cD . us,
|E2 | ≤
⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
:= k , and k is the maximum number of
links that D can create at time τ + τR at an SPE.
• D receives a beer reward than by playing its best strategy
in Situation 3, i.e., 1−τR − (|E1 | + |E2 |)cD ≥ τ − (n− 1)cD .
us, |E1 | + |E2 | ≤
⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
+ (n − 1). Note that |E1 | ≥
n − 1. Since k ≤ n − 1, then altogether D creates at most
|E1 | + |E2 | ≤ 2(n − 1) links.
For any SPE in Situation 2, we can write |E1 | = n − 1 + α
and |E2 | ≤ k − α , for some α < k . For Situation 2, we obtain
U
(ii)
A ≥ U
(i)
A which yields (min1≤i≤n di ) ≤
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
. If τR < cA, then
no SPE exists in Situation 2. Further, based on 0 ≤ U (ii)A −U
(iii)
A =
(|EA |−(min1≤i≤n di ))cA−(1−τ−τR ), we obtain |EA | ≥
⌈
1−τ−τR
cA
⌉
+
(min1≤i≤n di ). Since at τ + τR , D can create at most k − α links,
then the goal of A in case (iii) is to create at least ` = k − α + 2
components in the network (that is, to create a k−α +1 cut). Hence,
D constructs E1 in a way that at least kA+(min1≤i≤n di ) links need
to be removed so that the network consists of k +2−α components.
We denote k :=
⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
and kA :=
⌈
1−τ−τR
cA
⌉
. Suppose that
k < kA (i.e. k ≤ kA − 1). en, for any E1, consider the following
aack: rst remove α links so that the resulting network is a tree
and then remove k2 + 1 − α links. en, the resulting network has
exactly n−2−k +α links, that is, it has n−(n−2−k +α) = k −α +2
components and is obtained using k +1 < kA+ (min1≤i≤n di ) links.
us, if k < kA, no SPE in Situation 2 exists.
If k > kA + 1 (i.e. k ≥ kA), then we consider the strategy that
consists for D to create a line network at time 0. en to create
k + 2 components, A would need to remove k + 1 links. However,
due to k > kA + 1, it is not a best response for A. e best response
for A is to aack exactly one link (one being adjacent to one of the
nodes with degree 1). en, the best strategy for D is to recreate
this compromised link at time τ + τR which is an SPE. It is strategic
as it minimizes the number of created links. All other SPEs, i.e.,
trees created at time 0 and choices of the link to remove and the
one to heal, yield the same payos for both players. 
e following lemma characterizes the SPE in Situation 1:
Lemma 4.5. If τR/cA > n − 1 or
⌊
1−τ
cA
⌋
>
⌊
1−τ
cD
⌋
, then no SPE
exists in Situation 1. Otherwise, let (recall k =
⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
)
δ =

⌈
n(kRA+1)
2
⌉
if k ≥ 1 and kRA > 1,⌈
n(kHA +1)
2
⌉
if k = 0 and kRA > 1,
n if kHA = k + 1 and k
R
A = 1,
n +
⌊ n
k
⌋
+
⌈ b nk c
2
⌉
if kHA , k + 1 and k
R
A = 1,
n − 1 if kHA = k and kRA = 0,
n if kHA , k and k
R
A = 0.
(3)
If 1 < δcD or if 1 − τ < (δ − n + 1)cD , no SPE in Situation 1 exists.
Otherwise, the unique SPE is such thatUD = 1 − δcD andUA = 0.
Proof. At an SPE in Situation 1, UD is of the form 1 − cD |E1 |.
erefore, we obtain |E1 | ≤
⌊
1
cD
⌋
. Further, 1 − cD |E1 | should be
greater than the utility in Situation 3, i.e., τ − (n − 1)cD . us, we
obtain 1−τ ≥ (|E1 | − (n − 1))cD . Since 1−τ −τR < (n − 1)cD , then
1 − τ ≥ (|E1 | − (n − 1))cD + 1 − τ − τR − (n − 1)cD , that is
τR ≥ (|E1 | − 2(n − 1))cD . (4)
e SPE in Situation 1 satises U (i)A > U
(ii)
A and U
(i)
A > U
(iii)
A .
us, the goal of D is to create a network with the minimal cost
such that all nodes have a degree of at least
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
+ 1, and at least⌊
1−τ
cA
⌋
+ 1 links need to be removed to yield a network with k + 2
components (i.e., the minimum (k+1)-cut requires at least
⌊
1−τ
cA
⌋
+1
links). If kRA ≥ 1, we consider the strategy of D that consists in
creating an (N ,kRA + 1) Harary network. us,
|E1 | ≥

⌈
n(kRA+1)
2
⌉
if kRA ≥ 2,
n if kRA = 1,
n − 1 otherwise.
(5)
Denote kHD :=
⌊
1−τ
cD
⌋
. Suppose that kHD < k
H
A . Suppose that at
phase 0, D constructs a network with (n − 1) + k links for some
k ≤ kHD . Consider the strategy for A that consists in aacking
randomly kHA links. Since k
H
A ≥ kHD ≥ k , then the resulting network
has less than n − 1 links and is thus disconnected. At phase τ + τR ,
D can reconstruct at most (n − 1) + kHD − (n − 1) − k = kHD − k
links. en, the network at phase τ + τR would contain at most
(n − 1) + k − kHA + kHD − k = (n − 1) + kHD − kHA < n − 1 links, and
the network is disconnected. erefore, no SPE exists in Situation
1 if kAR < 4 and k
H
D < k
H
A .
Conversely, suppose that kHD ≥ kHA . We obtain
kHA ≤ kHD ⇒ 1−τcA − 1 <
⌊
1−τ
cA
⌋
≤
⌊
1−τ
cD
⌋
≤ 1−τcD ⇒
1
cA − 1cD < 11−τ ⇒
τR
cA −
τR
cD <
τR
1−τ < 1⇒ kRA ≤ kRD .
Similarly,
kHA ≤ kHD ⇒ 1cA − 1cD < 11−τ ⇒
1−τ−τR
cA −
1−τ−τR
cD <
1−τ−τR
1−τ < 1⇒
⌊
1−τ−τR
cA
⌋
≤ k .
By denition, kHA =
⌊
1−τ
cA
⌋
=
⌊
1−τ−τR
cA +
τR
cA
⌋
≤
⌊
1−τ−τR
cA
⌋
+⌊
τR
cA
⌋
+ 1 ≤ k + kRA + 1. us, kHA ≤ k + kRA + 1.
Case k > 0. If kRA ≥ 3, then kRA + 1 link removals are needed
to disconnect the network, and any further additional component
creation requires to remove at least 4/2 = 2 links. us, at least
2k + kRA + 1 link removals are necessary so that the network has
k + 2 components. us, A does not aack the network. If kRA = 2,
and if k ≤ ⌊ n2 ⌋ , then at least kRA + 1+ 2k link removals are required,
and otherwise kRA +1+
⌊ n
2
⌋
+ (k − ⌊ n2 ⌋) link removals are necessary.
us, A does not aack the network.
Casek = 0. In this case, kHA ≤ kRA+1. A only needs to disconnect
the network since D does not heal. us, D creates an (N ,kHA + 1)
Harary network at phase 0. Suppose that kRA = 0. en if k
H
A =
k , then D creates a tree network which is an optimal strategy.
Otherwise, kHA = k + 1 in which case D creates a ring network.
Finally, suppose thatkRA = 1. Ifk
H
A = k+1, then the ring network,
i.e., the (N , 2)-Harary network, is optimal for D. Otherwise, if
kHA = k + 2, then D needs to create a network of minimal cost
such that no k cut exists with k + 1 links. To this end, we consider
the following network. For each i ∈ N , we create a link between
nodes i and (i + 1) mod n (ring network). en, we connect node
k to node 2k , and connect node 2k to node 3k , and so on. If
⌊ n
k
⌋
is even, then we connect node k
⌊ n
k
⌋
to node 0. Otherwise, we
connect node 0 to any node of the network excluding 1 and n − 1.
e resulting network contains no k cut of size k + 1 links and is
minimal in terms of the number of links. e resulting utility for D
isUD = 1 − (n +
⌊ n
k
⌋
+
⌈ b nk c
2
⌉
)cD . 
e results of Lemmas 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 are summarized in Table 3.
Situation |E1 | |EA | |E2 | UD UA
1 δ 0 0 1 − cDδ 0
2 n − 1 1 1 1 − τR − ncD τR − cA
3 n − 1 k + 1 0 τ − (n − 1)cD 1 − τ − (k + 1)cA
5 0 0 0 0 1
Table 3: Properties of the dierent potential SPEs when 1 −
τ − τR < (n − 1)cD (Note: δ is given by Eq. (3)).
5 CASE STUDIES
In this section, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication
networks to corroborate the obtained results. UAVs become an
emerging technology to serve as communication relays, especially
in disaster recovery scenarios in which the existing communica-
tion infrastructures are out of service [11]. In the following, we
consider a team of n = 10 UAVs. e unitary costs of creating
and compromising a communication link between UAVs for the
operator/defender and adversary are cD = 1/20 and cA = 1/8,
respectively. When the adversary aacks the network at phase
τ = 0.3, and the defender heals it aer τR = 0.2, the UAV-enabled
communication network conguration at SPE is shown in Fig. 2
which admits a tree structure, and A does not aack the network at
SPE. In addition, the utilities for D and A at SPE with τR ∈ [0, 0.6]
are shown in Fig. 3. e SPE encounters switching with dierent
τR . As τR increases, the UAV network operator needs to allocate
more link resources to secure the network. Otherwise, the aacker
has an incentive to compromise the communication links with a
positive payo. Specically, when τR < 0.375, A does not aack
the UAV network, and D obtains a positive utility by constructing a
securely connected network. When 0.375 < τR < 0.5, the defender
creates a connected network with the minimum eort, i.e., 9 links,
at phase 0. In this interval, the aacker will successfully compro-
mise the system during phase [τ ,τ + τR ], and the defender heals
the network aerward. When τR exceeds 0.5, the defender does
not either protect or heal the network. e reason is that larger τR
provides more incentives for the aacker to compromise the links
and receive a beer payo. is also indicates that agile resilience
(small τR ) is critical in mitigating cyber threats in the infrastructure
networks.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have established a two-player three-stage dynamic
game for the infrastructure network protection and recovery. We
have characterized the strategic strategies of the network defender
UAV-based 
comm. network
Figure 2: UAV-based comm. network for disaster recovery.
e UAVs form a tree network at SPE (τ = 0.3, τR = 0.2).
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Figure 3: Utilities for D and A at SPE with varying τR .
and the aacker by analyzing the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
of the game. With a case study on UAV-enabled communication
networks for disaster recovery, we have observed that with an agile
response to the aack, the defender can obtain a positive utility by
creating a securely connected infrastructure network. Furthermore,
a higher level resilience saves link resources for the defender and
yields a beer payo. In addition, a longer duration between the
aack and recovery phases induces a higher level of cyber threats
to the infrastructures. Future work would include the extension of
the network formation problem to interdependent networks and
dynamic games with incomplete information.
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